For a history of effects:

Hume and German anti-rationalism by Sansonetti, Giuliano
The title of this paper was suggested by Isaiah Berlin’s famous essay
Hume and the Sources of German Anti-Rationalism, included in a volume cel-
ebrating the 200th anniversary of Hume’s death and reprinted in 1979 in
Against the Current1. Berlin’s essay deals with the reception of Hume’s philos-
ophy in J.G. Hamann and F.H. Jacobi: perhaps minor figures in the German
philosophical milieu at the turn of the nineteenth century, they played how-
ever a key role in the so-called Wendpunkt der geistigen Bildung der Zeit, which
spread from Germany to the whole of Europe and is usually characterised as
the transition from Enlightenment to Romanticism. Berlin’s readers may
remember that his interest for such a transition was crucial in his works and
thought.
Besides the circumstances by which it was occasioned, the essay describes
an important episode which had enormous consequences and is usually
defined as Romanticism, deemed as “the largest recent movement to trans-
form the lives and the thought of the Western world”2. Countering those
views and interpretations which cast doubts on Romanticism as a homoge-
neous or univocal phenomenon, Berlin’s position seems quite categorical. 
He wrote: “There was a romantic movement; it did have something which
was central to it; it did create a great revolution in consciousness; and it is
important to discover what this is”3. The Roots of Romanticism aims to demon-
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1 I. BERLIN, Against the Current. Essays in the History of Ideas, ed. by H. Hardy (Introd. by 
R. Hausheer), London, The Hogarth Press, 1979. The essay Hume and the Sources of German Anti-
Rationalism is at pp. 162-187.
2 I. BERLIN, The Roots of Romanticism, ed. by H. Hardy, Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1999, p. 1.
3 Ivi, p. 20.
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strate this thesis convincingly. It is not possible to discuss here Berlin’s idea of
Romanticism; it is sufficient to stress the relevance of Romanticism in Berlin’s
own words: “It seems to me to be the greatest single shift in the conscious-
ness of the West that has occurred, and all the other shifts which have
occurred in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries appear to me
in comparison less important, and at any rate deeply influenced by it”4. 
Berlin’s interpretation may be summarised as follows. Romanticism is the
most significant spiritual event to have occured in modern Europe. It was
generated by the crisis of the Enlightenment, which originated from a real
countermovement, described in the essay published in the late 1970s: The
Counter-Enlightenment 5. Hamann and Jacobi were certainly key players in
this countermovement, hence their crucial role in Berlin’s analysis, as were
several notions derived from Hume’s philosophical outlook which enjoyed a
certain renaissance within their thought, from death to transfiguration, so to
speak. Hamann’s and Jacobi’s philosophies acquire, therefore, a meaning and
a charm which are ambiguous and persistent. Thus, the microhistory of
Hume’s reception in the German philosophy is inserted into the macrohisto-
ry of European culture at the turn of the nineteenth century.
The crucial role Hume played in German philosophy was famously
acknowledged by Kant who thanks to Hume was woken from his dogmatic
slumber, that is from the Leibnizian and Wolffian metaphysics in which he
was educated. Kant’s criticism is obviously extraneous to Romantic philoso-
phy, as well as to Hamann’s and Jacobi’s thought. In fact, Kant is not men-
tioned by Berlin. However, it is worth noting the particular ways in which
their outlooks intersect: while Kant’s critical project is addressed at Hume’s
sceptical arguments, these very arguments are accepted by Hamann and
Jacobi and addressed at Kant’s criticism. In this respect, the goal of this paper
is more modest than Berlin’s, which aimed to question the general spirit of
the Enlightenment, especially focusing on the philosophes. 
Berlin is more interested in Hamann than in Jacobi, because of a special
sympathy with Hamann’s themes and his original and somewhat bizarre char-
acter. Notably, Berlin devoted an important work to Hamann’s unpublished
papers, The Magus of the North. J.G. Hamann and the Origins of Modern
Irrationalism6. However, in order to shed new light on the debate generated
by Kant’s philosophy, more attention should be paid to Jacobi and to his role
in the transition to German idealism. Thus, Jacobi’s work cannot be consid-
4 Ivi, pp. 1-2.
5 I. BERLIN, The Counter-Enlightenmnt, in Against the Current, pp. 1-24.
6 I. BERLIN, The Magus of the North. J.G. Hamann and the Origins of Modern Irrationalism, 
ed. by H. Hardy, London, Murray, 1993.
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ered just as the popularisation of Hamann’s ideas, as Berlin sometimes seems
to suggest. 
Let us return to the central topic of this paper, the spread of Hume’s ideas
in this crucial episode for the history of the European spirit. Berlin described
Hume’s influence as follows:
Hume’s chief service in his attack on the Enlightenment [...] consisted in doubting
two propositions. In the first place he doubted whether the causal relationship was
something which we directly perceived, or indeed knew to exist at all [...] The
second proposition doubted by Hume is more important for our purposes. When
he asked himself how he knew that there was an external world at all, he said he
could not deduce it logically. [...] Therefore I must accept the world as a matter of
belief, on trust.7
Therefore, the notion of belief reflects Hume’s position in the gnoseolog-
ical debate, originating from Descartes, regarding the reality of the external
world which can be believed, but not proved by sound arguments. The mean-
ing of the Humean belief turns significantly in Hamann and Jacobi. Quoting
a letter from Hamann to Jacobi, Berlin affirms that “There is no knowledge
save by direct perception – a direct sense of reality which Hamann calls
Glaube, faith, the direct capacity which all men have for unquestioning
acceptance of data and not ficta”8. As a consequence, faith (Glaube), here
meant as a synonym of belief, is deemed a particular form of sensitiveness,
similar to sight or touch, providing that immediate evidence of the existence
of the external world which could not be gained by any other means.
Following Jacobi, Hamann uses faith as a Troyan horse in order to defeat
rational thinking and disprove it as the only criterion in understanding the
moral and the natural world, an assumption supported by the
Enlightenment. It is not surprising that Hamann’s faith acquires a strong reli-
gious connotation: we are immediately conscious of both the external world
and of the existence of God, whom we know through an original revelation
analogous to that of the external world. Berlin correctly comments: “What
[...] has all this to do with David Hume? [...] Indeed, it has nothing to do
with Hume. But Hume, so it turned out, had, all unknowing, a good deal to
do with it”9.
Let us approach more specifically the topic of this paper by evoking that
Gadamerian Wirkungsgeschichte which I have defined in the title as a “histo-
ry of effects”, something different from and something more than a mere mis-
7 BERLIN, The Roots of Romanticism, pp. 32-33.
8 BERLIN, Hume and German Anti-Rationalism, p. 169.
9 Ivi, pp. 170-171. 
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understanding or a conscious deception. The point is that intellectual devel-
opments are akin to material transformations and mostly evade linear and
univocal explanations. It is not enough to say that Hume would be horrified
by this reading of his statements; it is more productive to try to understand
the renovation they produced in the history of ideas. On the other hand,
Berlin noted, the notion of belief was interpreted idiosyncratically because it
was not unambiguous – as Hume admitted in the Treatise – even though it
did not have the Lutheran-Pauline connotation given by Hamann. Hamann
himself looks somewhat lost when facing so polysemous a word, as he
acknowledges in a letter to Jacobi written in April-May 1787: “I do not know
what Hume or either of us understands by Glaube – the more we speak about
it, the less we shall manage to seize hold of this lump of quicksilver; Glaube
cannot be communicated like a parcel of goods, it is the kingdom of heaven
and hell within us” (W IV, 358)10.
However, we can affirm that the Pauline-Lutheran view on faith is large-
ly absent in Jacobi’s thought, where faith is discussed in terms not extraneous
to Hume and his logical-gnoseological perspective. Recent scholarship has
showed this unequivocally; in fact, while it is evident that Jacobi, under
Hamann’s influence, referred to Hume, Jacobi and Hamann did not agree on
the interpretation of the notion of faith and on the identification – support-
ed by the latter only – of natural and Christian (supernatural) faith. It there-
fore seems quite extreme to include Jacobi – sic et simpliciter – in the history
of modern irrationalism, as Berlin sometimes does. See for instance the com-
mentary given by Norberto Bobbio – a scholar non sympathetic with irra-
tionalism – who, editing Jacobi’s works in 1948, wrote: “Jacobi, the mystic
Jacobi, loves clarity and order [...] His writing is limpid, sober, unambiguous.
He slips into lyric-religious effusions only after a well-articulated criticism of
his opponents”11. As Valerio Verra stressed, while Hamann proposes a positive
view on faith, intended as the Judaic-Christian Revelation materialised in the
Bible, Jacobi endorses an Illuminist interpretation, where faith is a private
religiosity with strong moral implications and extraneous to historical and
10 “Noch weiß ich weder was Hume, noch weiß wir beide unter Glauben verstehen, und je mehr
wir darüber reden oder schreiben würden, desto veniger würde uns gelingen, dieser Quecksilber [...]
Glaube ist nicht Iedermanns Ding und auch nicht communicabel wie eine Waare, sondern das
Himmelreich und die Hölle in uns”. The German edition used is the one in 6 volumes edited by Jacobi
himself (vols I-III), J.F. Köppen (vols IV/1-IV/2), and F. Roth (vols IV/3-VI), printed in Leipzig between 1812
and 1825 (reprint: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1968 e 1976; Berliner Buchdienst,
Syndikat, 2001). References to Jacobi’s works are hereafter given with the letter W followed by the volume
and the page number, the abbreviation of the title and the number of the page in the English translation
contained in F.H. JACOBI, The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, ed. by G. di Giovanni,
Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994. The Spinoza Letters are abbreviated as LS, Idealism and
Realism as IR.
11 N. BOBBIO, Introd. to F.H. Jacobi, Idealismo e realismo, Torino, De Silva, 1948, p. XI.
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material elements. This religion calls Lessing’s to mind, although Lessing was
charged with pantheism in the famous Über die Lehre des Spinoza, in Briefen
an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn12. In fact, Jacobi witnessed the transition from
Enlightenment to Romanticism, the crisis of the former and the emerging of
the latter; “precisely because he was deeply involved in this crisis he has the
Enlightenment in mind, but, at the same time, he evades it. His evasion con-
sists in the exploration of the deep, mysterious, almost inaccessible roots of
our interaction with the absolute...”13. 
Jacobi’s acquaintance with the Enlightenment is proved not only by his
interpretation of religion, discussed above, but also by his own view on phi-
losophy as practical wisdom, a guide for a good life, in short “a philosophy
for life”. This leads to his refusal of systems, deemed as abstract and
Scholastic, and his tendency to a philosophy totally adhering to the remotest
aspects of life. In this respect, Jacobi’s thought is more sympathetic to British
philosophy, which he knew and praised, rather than with the German cul-
ture of the time. It is not surprising, then, that the title of one of his most
important works quotes the Edinburgh philosopher, David Hume, über den
Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, also containing an appendix, Ueber
den transcendentalen Idealismus, that would later become essential in the
post-Kantian debate14. Published two years after the Spinoza Letters had
placed Jacobi in the philosophical milieu, his work on Hume deals with the
relationship between “faith” and knowledge, a topic already discussed in the
Letters and fuelling a heated debate. It is revealing that David Hume started
with the clarification of the meaning of “faith” within the context of the dis-
pute on the problem of empirical evidence and its relation with the reality
of the external world15.
The shocking statement contained in the Spinoza Letters was that knowl-
edge is grounded in a “revelation”, an immediate intuition of reality, so that
knowledge is essentially a particular variety of faith. The passage is worthy of
quotation in full: 
12 V. VERRA, F.H. Jacobi. Dall’illuminismo all’idealismo, Ed. di Filosofia, Torino, 1963.
13 BOBBIO, Introd., p. XVI.
14 H.F. JACOBI, David Hume on Faith or Idealism and Realism, in The Main Philosophical
Writings, pp. 253-338; the appendix On Transcendental Idealism is at pp. 331-338.
15 As Emanuela Pistilli wrote, in an unpublished draft “Jacobi explained the anomalous use of
the word ‘faith’ with the need to counter the efforts of Dogmatic philosophies in applying rational 
(or formal) knowledge to the real world, in order to extend demonstrative evidence in the matters of fact,
typical of logic, disregarding the notion that logic deals with identity and reality is made of diversity”.
This is explained, Pistilli notes, by Jacobi’s belief that “the real, as well as freedom and creation, can not
be reduced to deductive reasoning” (E. PISTILLI, Tra dogmatismo e scetticismo. Fonti e genesi della filosofia
di F.H. Jacobi, Fabrizio Serra editore, Pisa-Roma, 2008, p. 167).
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My dear Mendelssohn [the addressee of the Letters], we are all born in the faith, and
we must remain in the faith, just as we are all born in society, and must remain in
society [...] How can we strive for certainty unless we are already acquainted with
certainty in advance, and how can we be acquainted with it except through some-
thing that we already discern with certainty? This leads to the concept of an imme-
diate certainty, which not only needs no proof, but excludes all proofs absolutely,
and is simply and solely the representation itself agreeing with the thing being represen-
ted. The conviction that they generate originates in comparison, and can never be
quite secure and perfect. But if every assent to truth not derived from rational
grounds is faith, then conviction based on rational grounds must itself derive from
faith, and must receive its force from faith alone [...]. A veritable and wondrous
revelation!16
The gnoseologic dispute dominating modern philosophy seems to be
here eliminated by a kind of unsophisticated realism, aiming to get rid of
dualism and adhering to an immediate “revelation”, a pure and original
source of knowledge. Yet, again, it should be noted that this realism is not
naïve, as it derives from an acute awareness of the limits and possibilities of
philosophy.
The principle of knowledge lies in an immediate belief, an original and
spontaneous Gewissheit, which, as Jacobi had written in an earlier work,
marks the boundary between truth and falsehood; it is a sort of original evi-
dence that however allows an argumentative reasoning as a “second-hand
evidence” and is the foundation of its persuasive power. This original belief
is thus defined: “through faith we know that we have a body, and that there
are other bodies and other thinking beings outside us”17. Jacobi here propos-
es a key comment, important too in his reaction to Kant, according to which
we “feel” the external bodies with the same evidence we have when we feel
our own existence, “without the Thou, the I is impossible”18. Moreover,
Jacobi writes: “Philosophers analyze, reason, and explain to what extent we
have experience of something outside us. I should mock these people,
16 “Lieber Mendelssohn, wir alle werden im Glauben geboren, und müßen im Glauben bleiben,
wie wir alle in Gesellschaft geboren werden, und in Gesellschaft bleiben müßen. Wie können wir nach
Gewißheit streben, wenn uns Gewißheit nicht zum voraus schon bekannt ist; und wie kann sie uns
bekannt sein, anders als durch etwas, das wir mit Gewißheit schon erkennen? Dieses führt zu dem
Begriffe einer unmittelbaren Gewißheit, welche nicht allein keiner Beweise bedarf, sondern schlechterd-
ings alle Beweise auschließt, und einzig und allein die mit dem vorgestellten Dingen übereinstimmende
Vorstellung selbst ist (also ihren Grund in sich selbst hat). Die Überzeugung durch Beweise ist eine
Gewißheit aus der zweiten Hand, beruht auf Vergleichung, und kann nicht recht sicher und vollkom-
men sein. Wenn nur Fürwahrhalten, welches nicht aus Vernunftgründen entspringt, Glaube ist, so mußt
die Überzeugung aus Vernunftgründen selbst aus dem Glauben kommen, und ihre Kraft von ihm allein
empfangen. [...] Eine wahrhafte, wunderbare Offenbarung” (W IV/1, pp. 210-211; LS 230-231). 
17 “Durch den Glauben wissen wir, daß wir einen Körper haben, und daß ausser uns andere
Körper und andere denkende Wesen vorhanden sind”.
18 “denn ohne Du, ist das Ich unmöglich” (W IV/1, 211; LS, 231).
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amongst whom I once counted myself. I open my eyes and ears, or stretch
out my hand, and I feel, in the same instant and inseparably, You and Me,
Me and You”19. 
The importance of such a statement in gnoseology is thus emphasised in
David Hume: “at the point of a simple perception [...] the I and the Thou, the
internal consciousness and the external object, must be present both at once
in the soul even in the most primordial and simple of perceptions – the two
in one flash, in the same indivisible instant, without before or after, without
any operation of the understanding”20, where the principle of realism is clear-
ly affirmed and the Cartesian primacy of the cogito and its evidence are radi-
cally challenged. 
The faith described in the Letters is not about “eternal truths”, but about
“the finite, accidental nature of man”21, as the principle of realism cannot but
confirm. As already noted, the David Hume was composed to clarify the
notion of faith as the first principle of knowledge and dispel any misunder-
standing. The authority of the Scottish philosopher is invoked to support
Jacobi’s thesis by means of extensive quotations from the Enquiry concerning
Human Understanding. As a matter of fact, as it was often noted and it is easy
to perceive, Jacobi sometimes manipulates Hume’s text, as Belief is not the
same as Glaube, since the former does not have the religious connotations
typical of the English word Faith. However, the German philosopher insists
that his notion of faith is not inconsistent with Hume’s and quotes Hume
himself: “faith is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady con-
ception of an object, than what imagination alone is ever able to attain”.
Jacobi is well aware that faith has an effect on knowledge only and does not
affect religious sentiments. At the same time, Jacobi perceives the probabilis-
tic character of human knowledge in Hume’s texts and recognises that this is
extraneous to his own ideas. He wrote: “[Hume] leaves it everywhere unde-
cided whether we actually perceive things outside us or merely perceive them
as outside us”22 and this undermines Jacobi’s alleged realism. Hume’s philos-
19 “Die Philosophen analysiren, und räsonniren, und expliziren, welcher Maassen es zugehe daß
wir erfahren: Etwas sey außer uns. Ich muß der Leute lachen, unter denen auch ich gewesen bin. Ich
öffne Aug’ oder Ohr, oder ich strecke meine Hand aus, und fühle in demselbigen Augenblick unz-
ertrennlich: Du und Ich; Ich und Du” (Jacobi’s letter to an anonymous recipient, 16 October 1775, quot-
ed in PISTILLI, Tra dogmatismo e scetticismo, p. 143).
20 “bei der allerersten und einfachsten Wahrnehmung, das Ich und das Du, inneres Bewußtsein
und äusserlicher Gegenstand, sogleich in der Seele da sein müssen; beides in demselben Nu, in demselben
untheilbaren Augenblicke, ohne vor und nach, ohne irgend eine Operation des Verstandes” (W II, 176;
IR, 277).
21 “die ewige Wahrheiten [...]sondern die endliche und zufällige Natur des Menschen” (W IV/1,
211-212; LS, 231).
22 “Hume [...] überall unentschieden läßt, ob wir Dinge wirklich ausser uns, oder bloß als außer
uns wahrnehmen” (W II, 165; IR, 272).
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ophy and its sceptical conclusion appear to Jacobi as hopelessly idealist, since
it is not possible to know the external world directly, but only through the
medium of ideas and representations of things. Hence, the definition of
Hume’s philosophy as a “sceptical idealism”. As a matter of fact, in order to
understand Jacobi’s position, it is necessary to look at Thomas Reid rather
than at Hume. Reid in fact affirms that things are known by a sort of revela-
tion and that philosophers from Plato to Hume dealt with representations of
things, instead of things themselves; as a result, they conclude that we do not
immediately perceive the external objects, but rather their images in the
mind. Reid observes that Hume 
adopts the theory of ideas in its full extent, and, in consequence, shews that there is
neither matter nor mind in the universe, nothing but impressions and ideas. What
we call a body, is only a bundle of sensations, and what we call the mind, is only a
bundle of thoughts, passions, and emotions, without any subject [...] The Egoists
[...] were left far behind by Mr Hume; for they believed their own existence, and
perhaps also the existence of a Deity. But Mr Hume’s system does not even leave
him a self to claim the property of his impressions and ideas.23
Following Reid, Jacobi adopts the definition of “speculative egoism” with
which he would later label all idealist philosophers from Kant to Schelling.
The point is that for Jacobi 
representations can never make the actual present as such. They only contain the
properties of actual things, not the actual itself. The actual can no more be presen-
ted outside its actual perception than consciousness can be presented outside consciou-
sness, life outside life, or truth outside truth. The perception of the actual and the fee-
ling of truth, consciousness, and life are one and the same thing.24
If the external world can be known only through an immediate percep-
tion, knowledge is not provided by reason, meant as the faculty of abstrac-
tion, comparison, and all other operations usually implied by the verb “to rea-
son”. According to Jacobi, immediate perception could be only ascribed to
Sinn, sense, taking this word “in the full extent of its meaning, as faculty of
perception in general”25. Sinn and Empfindung, sensation (even though sense
and sensation do not adequately translate the several nuances attributed by
Jacobi to these German words), indicate an immediate knowledge and
23 T. REID, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, ed. by D.R. Bookes and K. Haakonssen,
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2002, pp. 162-163.
24 “die Vorstellungen können nicht das Wirkliche, als solches, nie darstellen. Sie enthalten nur
Beschaffenheiten der wirklichen Dinge, nicht das Wirkliche selbst. Das Wirkliche kann außer der unmit-
telbaren Warhnehmung desselben ebensowenig dargestellt werden, als das Bewußtsein außer dem
Bewußtsein, das Leben außer dem Leben, die Wahrheit außer der Wahrheit. Wahrnehmung des Wirklichen
und Gefühl der Warheit, Vernunftsein und Leben, sin eine und dieselbe Sache” (W II, 232-233; IR, 305).
25 “in dem ganze Umfange seiner Bedeutung” (W II, 270; IR, 321).
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exclude any mediation through ideas, which, for Jacobi, would unavoidably
produce a loss of reality and the formation of a representation. Thus, Kantian
transcendental idealism’s goal of founding true, authentic realism through a
representation (Vorstellung) appeared contradictory and unjustified to Jacobi,
as he thought that the only real alternative was between realism and idealism,
as the subtitle of the David Hume declared. According to this analysis, Kant
stood between idealism and realism and was unable to opt for absolute real-
ism, the only sound choice according to Jacobi. Briefly, Jacobi’s definition of
faith is closely related to Pascal and Rousseau’s lumen naturale, that is a sen-
sitive faculty common to humankind and providing true knowledge. In this
sense, faith is “a limit to the knowledge attainable by reason and an absolute
limit of knowledge”26. 
To conclude, I would like to go back to Berlin, with whom I started. 
It is not possible not to endorse what he writes on Hamann and Jacobi: 
Nothing could have been further from Hume and his out look. The history of his
influence on a handful of German antinomian thinkers is no more than a footnote
in any account of his philosophy, although an exceedingly odd one. It is of some-
what greater importance to the history of irrationalist ideas in Europe, both reli-
gious and secular, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of which this
revolt against reason marks the modern beginnings.27
This should not be interpreted in negative terms only, as Berlin some-
times seems to do. In fact, we should ask whether the Romantic revolution
could have taken place without Hamann’s and Jacobi’s contribution. Berlin
himself portrays this revolution with passion and support and proposes a sort
of dialectic of Romanticism, opposed to Horkheimer and Adorno’s famous
dialectic of the Enlightenment: 
The result of Romanticism, then, is liberalism, toleration, decency and the appre-
ciation of the imperfections of life; some degree of increased rational self-understan-
ding. This was very far from the intentions of the Romantics. But at the same time
– and to this extent the romantic doctrine is true – they are the persons who most
strongly emphasised the unpredictability of all human activities.28
[translation by Cristina Paoletti]
26 PISTILLI, Tra dogmatismo e scetticismo, pp. 164-165.
27 BERLIN, Against the Current, p. 187.
28 BERLIN, The Roots of Romanticism, p. 147.
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